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continued federal support through block grants. The rebate program would have
continued much as before.
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SUMMARY
The Medicaid rebate program, established by the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
of 1990, has succeeded in reducing government spending on outpatient prescription
drugs. Under the basic rebate formula, pharmaceutical manufacturers rebate to the
states at least 15.1 percent of the wholesale price of brand-name drugs that Medicaid
beneficiaries purchase as outpatients. The basic rebate is often higher than that 15.1
percent minimum because of a "best-price" provision that gives Medicaid access to
the lowest price paid by any other purchaser in the United States. In fiscal year 1994,
Medicaid payments for outpatient prescription drugs totaled $9.5 billion. The total
rebates paid came to $1.8 billion, thereby reducing net Medicaid payments for
outpatient prescription drugs to $7.7 billion (see Summary Table).
Although the basic rebate has lowered Medicaidfs expenditures on outpatient
prescription drugs, spending on prescription drugs by non-Medicaid patients may have
increased as a result of the Medicaid rebate program. In particular, the best-price
provision has increased the prices paid by some purchasers in the private sector.
Since Medicaid constitutes between 10 percent and 15 percent of the market for
outpatient prescription drugs, pharmaceutical manufacturers are much less willing to
give large private purchasers steep discounts off the wholesale price when they also
have to give Medicaid access to the same low price. As a result, the largest discounts
that pharmaceutical manufacturers give off the wholesale price-the best-price
discounts-have fallen from an average of more than 36 percent in 1991 to 19 percent
in 1994. Hence, although the Medicaid rebate appears on the surface to be attractive,
it may have had unintended consequences for private purchasers. Rather than
continuing to give Medicaid access to the lowest prices available in 1991, manu-
facturers often chose to increase their best prices.
Under the best-price provision, state Medicaid agencies obtain access to the
lowest prices paid for prescription drugs by any purchaser in the United States
without having to duplicate the efforts of large private purchasers to earn those
discounts. Many large private purchasers use a formulary—a list of drugs that doctors
are encouraged to prescribe for a given illness—to guide their patients toward the
most cost-effective drugs. In return for being listed on the formulary, manufacturers
are sometimes willing to offer a substantial discount. However, state Medicaid
programs need not adopt those practices to obtain large discounts on brand-name
drugs from manufacturers. One alternative to the Medicaid rebate would be for states
to adopt the practices of private purchasers and negotiate their own discounts with
manufacturers. Whether the states would be able to obtain discounts as large as those
that they get under the Medicaid rebate program is unclear.
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SUMMARY TABLE. MEDICAID EXPENDITURES ON PRESCRIPTION DRUGS, 1984-1994
(By fiscal year, in billions of dollars)
Year
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
Total
Expenditures
2.0
2.3
2.7
3.1
3.4
3.9
4.6
5.6
7.1
8.5
9.5
Total Rebates
Collected
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
aa.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
0.1
0.9
1.5
1.8
NetMedicaid
Expenditures
2.0
2.3
2.7
3.1
3.4
3.9
4.6
5.5
6.2
7.0
7.7
SOURCE: Health Care Financing Administration, trend data based on Form 64.
NOTE: n.a. = not applicable.
The Congress is currently considering reforming the Medicaid program through
block grants. Under the Balanced Budget Act of 1995, which was passed by the
Congress in November but vetoed by the President, states would have had full
responsibility for the Medicaid program, and federal funding would no longer have
been directly linked to the level of state expenditures. The act would have preserved
the Medicaid rebate program. However, the savings from the rebate program would
no longer have been shared with the federal government, but rather would have
belonged entirely to the states. As long as states continued to offer prescription drug
benefits to their current Medicaid beneficiaries, they would probably have continued
to participate in the rebate program under this reform.
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HOW THE MEDICAID REBATE PROGRAM WORKS
Medicaid provides health care coverage primarily to low-income families with
dependent children and low-income aged or disabled individuals. The federal
government and the states share funding for the program. The federal share of
Medicaid expenditures averages about 57 percent. The states administer the program
under broad federal guidelines that allow each state to determine, within established
limits, exactly who is covered, the extent of services offered, and the method of
reimbursing providers. All states offer outpatient prescription drug coverage to most
of their Medicaid beneficiaries, though they are not required to do so.
Pharmaceutical manufacturers must sign a rebate agreement with the Secretary
of Health and Human Services in order for Medicaid to cover their products. If a
manufacturer decides not to enter into a rebate agreement, then states do not receive
federal Medicaid reimbursements for purchases of that company's drugs.
The manufacturer directly pays the Medicaid rebate on outpatient prescription
drugs to each state Medicaid agency. All forms of the Medicaid rebate are based on
the average manufacturer price (AMP) paid by wholesalers, inclusive of all discounts
and price reductions "for drugs distributed to the retail pharmacy class of trade." The
basic rebate ensures that Medicaid pays manufacturers no more—and sometimes less—
than any private purchaser in the United States for outpatient prescription drugs.
If a brand-name drug's AMP rises faster than the inflation rate, an additional
rebate is imposed so that manufacturers cannot offset the basic rebate by raising their
AMP. The additional rebate is equal to the difference between the current AMP and
a base-year AMP increased by the inflation rate as measured by the consumer price
index.
Finally, manufacturers pay a rebate equal to 11 percent of the AMP on generic
and over-the-counter drugs. To encourage states to promote substituting lower-cost
generic drugs for brand-name ones, federal regulations set special reimbursement
limits on 100 to 200 drugs that have generic substitutes.
HOW BEST-PRICE DISCOUNTS HAVE CHANGED
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) analyzed the change in best-price discounts
on more than 800 brand-name drugs purchased by Medicaid beneficiaries. In 1991,
nearly one-third of the brand-name drugs still under patent (single-source drugs) had
a best-price discount as high as 50 percent. But by 1994, only 9 percent of the single-
source drugs had a best-price discount in that range. That change in pricing is
particularly important since single-source drugs constitute over two-thirds of
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Medicaid reimbursements and are a major component of total U.S. expenditures on
prescription drugs. (The decline in the weighted average best-price discount appears
to have leveled off by 1994 as firms finished adjusting to the incentives created by the
best-price provision.)
The quantity of drugs sold at the best price is not known. Therefore, the
magnitude of the effect of the change in pricing on private-sector purchasers is
difficult to assess. The fall in the size of the best-price discounts between 1991 and
1994 suggests that purchasers with access to those discounts have been hurt by the
best-price provision of the Medicaid rebate program. The reduction in the best-price
discounts between 1991 and 1994 exceeded 30 percentage points for nearly one-
quarter of the drugs in the sample analyzed by CBO. Such a large percentage-point
change may have affected more purchasers than just those that received the best-price
discount. Any purchaser that received a discount within 30 percentage points of the
best-price discount would certainly have been affected by the change in best-price
discounts on those drugs.
The best-price provision increases the Medicaid rebate when a manufacturer
gives a discount off the AMP that exceeds the minimum rebate of 15.1 percent.
Therefore, only those private purchasers that had access to discounts in excess of 15.1
percent of the AMP would pay more as a result of the best-price provision.
Since the AMP is not public information, purchasers may not know whether their
discounts are in excess of the minimum rebate. CBO calculates that the AMP is, on
average, equal to about 80 percent of the published list price (also known as the
average wholesale price). Hence, purchasers would have to get a discount equivalent
to one-third off the list price before possibly being affected by the best-price
provision.
The General Accounting Office surveyed four health maintenance organizations
(HMOs) and eight hospital purchasing groups in 1990 and 1991 and found that the
discounts those purchasers obtained averaged between 29 percent and 34 percent off
the list price. In other words, those purchasers were, on average, getting discounts
right at the threshold where the best-price provision can take effect. Some drugs that
they purchased would have had discounts above that average and hence could have
been affected by the best-price provision.
Several types of purchasers can obtain steep discounts from manufacturers and
therefore may have been affected by the best-price provision. Those purchasers
include hospitals, HMOs, clinics, nursing homes, mail-order pharmacies, and third-
party payers that manage their prescription drug benefits—often with the assistance
of pharmaceutical benefit management companies.
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HOW THE MEDICAID REBATE AFFECTS PRICING
The Medicaid rebate is based on a complex pricing structure in which firms practice
price discrimination by charging different prices to different types of purchasers. Price
discrimination occurs in markets in which purchasers are broken into groups that vary
in their sensitivity to price and suppliers have some degree of market power. Under
some circumstances, price discrimination can increase both profits and total benefits
to consumers. In the pharmaceutical industry, the retail sector often pays higher prices
than some large institutional purchasers.
Why Best-Price Discounts Decline
In negotiating discounts with private purchasers, the manufacturers balance the
decline in price on current sales against the increase in profits from the new sales that
a larger discount will bring. Because Medicaid must be given access to the best price
negotiated with any U.S. purchaser, the size of the rebate that would be paid to
Medicaid must also be calculated as part of the cost of offering that best price to
private purchasers. Since the Medicaid market is so large, the best-price provision
can more than double the cost of giving discounts in excess of the minimum rebate.
The size of the Medicaid market varies widely for different drugs. CBO
calculated the Medicaid market share for 89 top-selling drugs. For 20 percent of
those drugs, less than 5 percent of total sales went to Medicaid beneficiaries. For 16
percent of the drugs, Medicaid's market share exceeded 20 percent. The average
Medicaid market share for all drugs in the sample was 12.2 percent. The larger
Medicaid's market share, the greater should be the impact of the Medicaid rebate on
the pricing of a drug. Those drugs with a small Medicaid market share are more
insulated from the potential effects of the best-price provision.
The effect of the Medicaid rebate on discounting also depends on the magnitude
of the difference between the AMP and the best price. The best-price provision affects
the pricing only of those drugs that firms wish to discount significantly to some
purchasers. If the manufacturer of a drug would not offer a discount in excess of 15
percent, even if there was no Medicaid rebate, then the best-price provision would not
affect the pricing of that drug. Manufacturers appear to offer larger discounts to
some purchasers when many substitutes are available. In 1991, the best-price
discount of brand-name drugs with no generic substitutes in CBO's sample averaged
35 percent, whereas the best-price discount of brand-name drugs that had chemically
equivalent drugs on the market (usually generic) averaged 51 percent. The best-price
provision probably has less effect on the pricing of highly innovative new drugs that
face little competition than on the pricing of drugs that have several close substitutes.
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The Medicaid Rebate and the Retail Sector
The Medicaid rebate not only affects the lowest prices charged by the manufacturer
for a drug, but it could also affect the price charged to wholesalers for the retail class
of trade—namely, the average manufacturer price. The minimum rebate, which is
based on the AMP, would by itself create an incentive for manufacturers to raise their
prices to wholesalers. However, the additional rebate does exactly the opposite—it
reduces revenues on Medicaid sales when a firm raises the AMP faster than the
inflation rate. The basic rebate when combined with the additional rebate does not
create an incentive for firms to increase their AMP in real terms (that is, faster than
the inflation rate as measured by the consumer price index for all urban consumers).
However, new drugs may be launched at a slightly higher price because of the
Medicaid rebate. The larger Medicaid's anticipated share in total sales of a drug, the
more important that effect is. The additional rebate is based on the increase in a
drug's AMP since its first quarter on the market. Consequently, the additional rebate
penalizes a pricing strategy that consists of a low introductory price followed by
increases over time as the chug becomes better known. Both the minimum rebate and
the additional rebate create an incentive to charge a slightly higher launch price. All
things being equal, that effect implies that a drug with a significant market share
anticipated for Medicaid may be launched at a slightly higher price because of the
Medicaid rebate program.
CHANGES IN THE AVERAGE MEDICAID REBATE
Because of reduced discounts to private purchasers, the Medicaid program has not
benefited as fully from the 1990 policy change as it might have. If the best-price
discounts had been as high in 1994 as they were in 1991, CBO calculates, the average
basic rebate paid would have been 38.6 percent rather than just 22.8 percent. But the
decline of best-price discounts between 1991 and 1994, in part because of the
Medicaid rebate program, was hardly a surprise to policymakers. In fact, CBO
assumed a decline in best-price discounts when it originally projected the savings from
the Medicaid rebate program.
Although the basic rebate was capped at 25 percent in 1991 and not capped in
1994, the best-price provision increased the average basic rebate paid by 7 to 8
percentage points of AMP in both 1991 and 1994. The decline in best-price discounts
since 1991 has limited the contribution of the best-price provision to the average basic
rebate. Indeed, that contribution is no higher now than it was in 1991 under the cap.
SUMMARY xv
ALTERNATIVES TO THE BEST-PRICE PROVISION
Rather than extending their best prices to the entire Medicaid market, firms more
often have chosen to raise their best prices (that is, lower their discounts). However,
when that occurs, both the government and some private-sector purchasers lose.
Fortunately, some alternatives exist that would reduce the impact of the best-price
provision on firms' incentive to offer steep discounts without reducing the savings
obtained through the Medicaid rebate program.
Modifying the best-price provision could benefit purchasers that negotiate
discounts with pharmaceutical manufacturers because manufacturers would not pay
as large a penalty for offering generous discounts. CBO estimates that a repeal of the
best-price provision would not affect the total rebate savings in 1996 if the minimum
rebate was increased from 15.1 percent to 22.6 percent. Alternatively, a cap of 50
percent on the basic rebate would be budget neutral if the minimum rebate was
increased from 15.1 percent to 16.7 percent.
Another alternative is to eliminate the Medicaid rebate program and fold
Medicaid beneficiaries into managed care plans that can negotiate their own discounts
on outpatient drugs from manufacturers. Of course, that policy has broad implica-
tions beyond the cost and use of prescription drugs by Medicaid beneficiaries. As of
the end of 1994, eight states had obtained waivers from statutory requirements from
the Health Care Financing Administration allowing them to move a large portion of
their Medicaid beneficiaries into managed care organizations. Most of those states
have forgone the Medicaid rebates for beneficiaries enrolled in managed care
organizations (or plan to). This latter option could still benefit states if the managed
care organizations cover outpatient prescription drugs at a very reasonable rate based
in part on their ability to negotiate their own discounts.

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Pharmaceutical manufacturers often charge different types of purchasers different
prices for the same product. Such price discrimination occurs in markets where
suppliers have some degree of market power and purchasers can be separated into
groups that vary in their sensitivity to price. In the pharmaceutical industry, that
varying price sensitivity, when combined with patent protection and low production
costs, can lead to a wide spectrum of prices for a single pharmaceutical product.
Consider, for example, that pharmaceutical manufacturers charge wholesalers
more for the drugs they distribute to retail pharmacies than they charge some other
type& of large-scale purchasers, such as hospitals, nursing homes, and health
maintenance organizations. Manufacturers are sometimes willing to give steep
discounts to such institutional purchasers in return for being listed on a formulary—an
established list of drugs that is used to guide the prescribing practices of doctors.
Retail customers generally pay higher prices, in part because if they have health
insurance coverage, frequently neither they nor their doctors take price into account.
In 1970, only 18 percent of outpatient prescription drug expenditures were covered
by third-party payers; by 1993, that amount had grown to 43 percent.1 As one
economist has pointed out, "The combination of physician decision-making, imperfect
information, and third-party payment makes drug demand stronger and less price-
elastic than it might otherwise be, conferring considerable monopoly power upon the
sellers of well-accepted drugs."2 Although that situation has begun to change as
computer networks enable pharmacists to monitor formulary compliance for third-
party payers, the retail sector remains one of the least price-sensitive segments of the
pharmaceutical market.
Manufacturers can increase profits by categorizing purchasers and charging
each group a distinct price that maximizes profits from sales to that group. Those
purchasers that are more sensitive to price are better off under price discrimination.
Conversely, those that are less sensitive to price pay more but are willing to do so.
Manufacturers may find it profitable to offer some purchasers a very low price as long
as that price exceeds production costs, which are markedly low in the pharmaceutical
industry. Although the capitalized costs of research and development (R&D) for
drugs marketed in the 1980s averaged close to $200 million per drug, production
1. Katherine Levit, Arthur Sensenig, and others, National Health Expenditures, 1993, Health Care Financing Review,
vol. 16, no. 1 (Fall 1994), p. 258.
2. P.M. Scherer, Pricing, Profits, and Technological Progress in the Pharmaceutical Industry, Journal of Economic
Perspectives, vol. 7, no. 3 (Summer 1993), p. 99.
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costs averaged about 25 percent of manufacturer sales.3 On average, the price
manufacturers charge must be high enough to generate a return on the large
investment they have made in the R&D process. But charging very low prices to
some purchasers can increase profits as long as those lower prices increase sales
volume sufficiently while covering production costs.
The Medicaid rebate program is based on this complex pricing structure.
Medicaid patients typically purchase their outpatient prescription drugs from retail
pharmacies and account for 10 percent to 15 percent of the outpatient drug market.
Thus, before the rebate program began in 1991, when Medicaid paid for outpatient
drugs it paid retail prices despite its large market share. Partly in response to that
situation, the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990 established the Medicaid
rebate on outpatient prescription drugs to give the Medicaid program access to the
same low prices that pharmaceutical manufacturers offer to other large purchasers.
The basic Medicaid rebate equals at least 15.1 percent of the average price
paid by wholesalers. The basic rebate also contains a "best-price" provision that gives
state Medicaid agencies access to the lowest price paid by any private purchaser in the
United States. Moreover, state Medicaid agencies need not duplicate the efforts of
private purchasers—such as negotiating with manufacturers and applying a strict
formulary—to gain access to the lowest prices available.
The best-price provision appears on the surface to be attractive, but it may
have had unintended consequences for both Medicaid and non-Medicaid purchasers.
Many manufacturers have responded to the provision by raising the lowest prices
previously offered to some private purchasers rather than giving Medicaid access to
their lowest price. Hence, for many drugs, Medicaid did not succeed in getting the
low prices obtained by some purchasers before 1991 because many of those prices
increased substantially after the rebate program began.
At the end of November, the Congress passed the Balanced Budget Act of
1995, which the President vetoed. That act would have reformed the Medicaid
program through block grants. States would have taken over the fall responsibility
for the Medicaid program, and the federal government would have continued to
support Medicaid through fixed payments that would have no longer been tied
directly to state expenditures. The Medicaid rebate formula for Pharmaceuticals
would have continued in its current form, and the Health Care Financing
Administration would have continued to collect the necessary price data from
manufacturers. States could have chosen whether they wished to participate in the
rebate program. Since the revenues collected through the rebate program would have
3. Office of Technology Assessment, Pharmaceutical R&D: Costs, Risks and Rewards (February 1993), pp. 91-93.
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belonged entirely to the states, all states probably would have chosen to participate
provided they continued to offer prescription drug benefits to Medicaid beneficiaries.
Under the block grant program, the states would have no longer shared with
the federal government any savings resulting from cutbacks in Medicaid prescription
drug coverage. Hence, although states are currently not required to offer prescription
drug coverage, they would have had a greater incentive than now exists to reduce the
number of people eligible for prescription drug coverage under Medicaid or to
eliminate drug coverage entirely. A cutback in Medicaid drug coverage by the states
would reduce the impact of the Medicaid rebate program on drug pricing. The
Congress and the President are currently negotiating a revised version of that bill, and
the outcome is unknown.

CHAPTER n
HOW MEDICAID AND THE REBATE PROGRAM WORK
The purpose of the Medicaid rebate program, established by the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1990 (OBRA-90), is to reduce federal and state government
spending on outpatient prescription drugs. In fiscal year 1994, the Medicaid rebate
saved federal and state governments $1.8 billion. Total Medicaid expenditures on
outpatient drugs in 1994, net of the rebate, were $7.7 billion.
MEDICAID
The Social Security Amendments of 1965 established the Medicaid program.
Medicaid provides health care coverage primarily to low-income families with
dependent children and to low-income aged or disabled individuals. The federal
government funds 50 percent to 83 percent of Medicaid payments to health care
providers in each state (state governments pay the remainder). The federal share is
inversely related to the state's per capita income and equals about 57 percent on
average.1
The states administer the Medicaid program under broad federal guidelines that
allow each state to determine, within established limits, exactly who is covered, the
extent of services offered, and the method for reimbursing health care providers.
Although states are not required to cover outpatient prescription drugs for Medicaid
beneficiaries, all states do offer such coverage to most of their beneficiaries.2
Eligibility
Under current rules, states have considerable discretion in determining who is eligible
for Medicaid. They are required to offer Medicaid to all families that qualify for
assistance under Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC). (These are low-
income families with children and usually one absent or unemployed parent.) But
each state sets its own eligibility standards for AFDC based on its assessment of the
cost of basic necessities such as food, clothing, and shelter in that state. Those
1. Health Care Financing Administration, Health Care Financing Review, Medicare and Medicaid Statistical Supplement
1995 (1995), pp. 118-127 and Table 103.
2. National Phannaceiiticaia>until,PJw^ NPC,
September 1994), pp. 251-559.
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eligibility standards vary widely. In 1994, the income eligibility standard for AFDC
ranged from 17 percent to 81 percent of the federal poverty level.3
The other major group that states are required to cover is recipients of
Supplemental Security Income (SSI)—namely, low-income elderly, blind, or disabled
people. Twelve states apply more restrictive standards for this group and therefore
do not offer Medicaid to all recipients of SSI cash grants.4 States can also elect to
offer Medicaid to low-income institutionalized people who do not receive SSI.
Furthermore, states have the option to extend Medicaid coverage to the
medically needy. Those are people who meet the nonfinancial criteria for categorical
eligibility—specifically, members of single-parent families with dependent children and
the aged, blind, or disabled—but who have incomes above the state's eligibility
standards for welfare. Currently, 35 states and the District of Columbia offer
Medicaid coverage to medically needy individuals.5
Recent federal legislation has extended Medicaid coverage to some groups that
do not meet the general (nonfinancial) criteria for welfare eligibility. Medicaid now
covers children under 6 and pregnant women in all families with incomes below 133
percent of the federal poverty level. Certain other low-income groups of pregnant
women and children are also eligible for Medicaid.6 In addition to those who are
categorically eligible, Medicaid now assists all Medicare beneficiaries who have
incomes below the poverty line by picking up Medicare premiums and cost-sharing
requirements. However, that group of people, known as qualified Medicare
beneficiaries, is not eligible for Medicaid's prescription drug benefits.
Prescription Drug Coverage
Coverage of outpatient prescription drugs is among the optional benefits left to each
state's discretion. Inpatient drugs are covered as part of the medical services offered
3. National Governors' Association, Health Policy Studies Division, "State Coverage of Pregnant Women and Children-February
1995," MCH Update (March 1995), Table 3. The unweighted average for the 50 states was 44.2 percent of the
federal poverty level.
4. These are known as 209(b) states. States can use more restrictive standards only if the standards were part of a state's
approved Medicaid plan before the SSI program began. See Congressional Budget Office, Factors Contributing to the
Growth of the Medicaid Program, CBO Memorandum (May 1992), p. 4.
5. National Governors' Association, "State Coverage of Pregnant Women and Children," Table 5.
6. States are required to offer Medicaid to children under 18 born after September 30,1983, with family incomes below the
poverty level. States may choose to offer Medicaid to pregnant women and infants under age 1 with family incomes
between 133 percent and 185 percent of the poverty level. Health Care Financing Administration, Health Care Financing
Review, Medicare and Medicaid Statistical Supplement 1995, p. 118.
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by a hospital or skilled nursing facility.7 The majority of states choose to offer
outpatient prescription drug coverage to all Medicaid recipients (30 states and the
District of Columbia did so in 1993), and all states offer outpatient prescription drug
coverage at least to those people receiving cash grants from AFDC or SSL8
Medicaid's prescription drug coverage has relatively low cost-sharing
requirements. Federal regulations place limits on the deductibles and copayments that
states may charge. Federal regulations also prohibit states from imposing cost-sharing
requirements on children, pregnant women, and institutionalized people. The
deductibles for all health services cannot exceed $24 a year per family. The maximum
copayment allowed on a prescription that costs from $25 to $50 is $2, and copay-
ments for health services can never exceed $3.9 In 1993,27 states and the District of
Columbia required some Medicaid beneficiaries to make copayments when purchasing
a prescription drug.10
Reimbursement Rules for Outpatient Prescription Drugs
States pay health care providers directly for services rendered to Medicaid
beneficiaries. However, providers that choose to participate in the Medicaid program
must accept the state's reimbursements as full payment. For outpatient drug benefits,
pharmacies are typically the direct provider. Wider participation by pharmacies
enables more Medicaid beneficiaries to obtain prescriptions at convenient locations,
but wider participation also costs more if reimbursement rates must rise to attract
greater participation by providers. Thus, when setting reimbursement rates, states
must balance their budgetary concerns against the need to provide sufficient incentives
for providers to participate.
Each state Medicaid agency sets the reimbursement rate to pharmacies based on
the federal regulations created by the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA)
within the Department of Health and Human Services. Those regulations leave the
states with some discretion in setting reimbursement rates. For brand-name drugs that
have no generic substitutes (single-source drugs), the reimbursement rate is equal to
the lower of the pharmacy's usual and customary charge or the pharmacist's estimated
acquisition cost plus a dispensing fee, both of which are set by the state.11 The
7. Pharmaceuticals used by patients in a nursing care facility are subject to the Medicaid rebate only if they are billed
separately rather than as part of the per diem rate.
8. National Pharmaceutical Council, Pharmaceutical Benefits Under State Medical Assistance Programs, pp. 251-559.
9. Code of Federal Regulations, title 42, section 447.54. The maximum copayment on a prescription that costs $25 or less
is$l.
10. National Pharmaceutical Council, Pharmaceutical Benefits Under State Medical Assistance Programs, p. 139.
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dispensing fee is usually between $3 and $5. The estimated acquisition cost is
frequently based on the published average wholesale price of the drug, which is the
manufacturer's suggested price to the pharmacist. In most states, the estimated
acquisition cost is set 5 percent to 11 percent below the published average wholesale
price.12 Researchers have found that state Medicaid payments to independent and
chain-store pharmacies are roughly equal to the average cost of filling a prescription.13
To encourage states to promote lower-cost generic drugs, federal regulations set
special reimbursement limits on 100 to 200 drugs that have generic substitutes. Those
regulations limit the state expenses that are eligible for federal reimbursement to ISO
percent of the lowest published generic price plus a reasonable dispensing fee.
However, that lower federal reimbursement rate does not apply if the physician writes
"brand necessary," "medically necessary," or just "necessary" on the prescription. In
that case, the reimbursement formula for single-source drugs applies.14
The generic drug used as a basis for reimbursement must be widely available and
rated as both bioequivalent and therapeutically equivalent to the original patented
drug by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). The price of this drug, increased
by SO percent, is referred to as the maximum allowable cost. That limit on reimburse-
ment is not applied individually to each drug appearing on HCFA's list but rather to
the state's total expenditures on all of the listed drugs. As long as the state pays on
average no more than the maximum allowable cost for the listed drugs, it will receive
its full share of federal funding. But the federal government will not pay its share of
the state's expenditures that exceed the total spending limit set for those drugs.
The application of federal guidelines on generic substitution differ in each state.
Some states choose to limit the reimbursement rate on multisource drugs to the
maximum allowable cost set by HCFA plus a dispensing fee. Since the acquisition
costs of brand-name drugs are much higher than the maximum allowable cost, that
11. One exception exists in states that have allowed some Medicaid benefidaries to enroU in health maintenaiK« organizations.
The state pays a fixed amount to the HMO that does not depend on the amount of services actually used by the Medicaid
beneficiary.
12. National Pharmaceutical Council, Pharmaceutical Benefits Under State Medical Assistance Programs, p. 139. One
source for the average wholesale price is the Red Book* published by Medical Economics Data Production Company
(Montvale, N.J.: Medical Economics Data, 1994).
13. E. Kathleen Adams, David H. Kreling, and Kathleen Gondek, "State Medicaid Phannacy Payments and Their Relation
to Estimated Costs," Health Care Financing Review, vol. 15, no. 3 (Spring 1994). Those states that have lower
estimated acquisition costs tend to have higher dispensing fees. Hospital outpatient pharmacies may be able to purchase
Pharmaceuticals at a significantly lower price than other types of pharmacies. See General Accounting Office,
Medicaid: Outpatient Drug Costs and Reimbursements for Selected Pharmacies in Illinois and Maryland, GAO/HRD-93-
55FS (March 1993).
14. Code of Federal Regulations, title 42, section 447.331.
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difference creates an incentive for the pharmacist to dispense the generic drug—except
when the brand-name drug is deemed "necessary.11 Overall, the Congressional Budget
Office calculates that 52 percent of Medicaid prescriptions dispensed in 1993 were for
a generic drug.15
Cost Containment Efforts by the States
Both in response to federal reimbursement limits on multisource drugs and to reduce
Medicaid expenditures, many states have taken further measures to encourage generic
substitution. Some states use formularies that indicate which drugs are generally
covered by the state Medicaid program.16 The state can subject nonformulary drugs
to a prior-authorization procedure or even refuse coverage if the drug is
therapeutically equivalent to another drug on the formulary.17 In 1992, 22 states
required pharmacists to dispense generic drugs when available, unless the doctor's
prescription ruled out generic substitution.18
All but eight states have some type of limit on the quantity of drugs used, be it
a limit on the number of prescriptions per month, on the number of refills, or on the
quantity dispensed per prescription. Thirty-four states limit the quantity of any single
prescription, and 20 states limit the number of refills.19 Many use prior-authorization
programs to enforce those limits on quantity.20
Prescription drugs can be divided into three categories: single-source innovator
drugs, multiple-source innovator drugs, and generic drugs. All innovator drugs have
been approved by the FDA under an original new-drug application, and most have
also been patented. Single-source drugs have a unique combination of active
15. Congressional Budget Office tabulation based on data collected by the Health Cane Financing Administration for the
Medicaid rebate program.
16. Health Care Financing Administration, Manufacturers1 Prices and Pharmacists' Charges for Prescription Drugs Used
by the Elderly (June 1990), p. 36.
17. The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990 prohibited states from refusing to cover the drugs of any manufacturer
that had signed a rebate agreement OBRA-93 modified that provision, however. Under the supervision of a committee
made up of pharmacists and doctors, the states can exclude from their formulary any drug that "does not have a
significant, clinically meaningful therapeutic advantage in terms of safety, effectiveness, or clinical outcome of such
treatment for such population over other drugs included in the formulary"; 42 U.S.C. 1396r-8 (d) (4) (c), 107 Stat 619.
IS. National Pharmaceutical Council, Pharmaceutical Benefits Under State Medical Assistance Programs (September
1993),p. 111.
19. National Pharmaceutical Council, Pharmaceutical Benefits Under State Medical Assistance Programs (September
1994), p. 145. All states cover certain over-the-counter drugs through Medicaid's outpatient drug benefit
20. The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990 placed restrictions on the prior-authorization programs used by state
Medicaid agencies. States are required to give prior authorization within 24 hours of a request and to waive prior
approval in emergency situations.
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ingredients that are not available in any other drug product. Multiple-source
innovator drugs have been approved by the FDA as an original new drug, but other
bioequivalent drugs are available with the same combination of active ingredients.
That situation occurs either because more than one firm has the right to produce the
innovator drug (perhaps through a licensing agreement) or because the patent of the
innovator drug has expired and generic versions are being produced.
In 1993, approximately half of all Medicaid outpatient prescriptions were filled
with a generic drug. Yet those drugs accounted for only 22 percent of the dollar
value of reimbursements (see Table 1). The difference occurred because generic
drugs are much cheaper than innovator drugs. That over half of all prescriptions
dispensed to Medicaid beneficiaries were for a generic drug indicates a high level of
generic substitution. Only 10 percent of the prescriptions were for innovator
multiple-source drugs—in those instances, a brand-name drug was prescribed,
although a generic drug was available.
Thirty-eight percent of prescriptions dispensed were for a single-source drug,
and those drugs accounted for over two-thirds of total reimbursements. The higher
prices of innovator single-source drugs cause their share in reimbursements to far
exceed their share in total units dispensed.
TABLE 1. MEDICAID EXPENDITURES ON GENERIC AND BRAND-NAME DRUGS, 1993
(In percent)
Share of*
Outpatient Drug Share of
Drug Type Reimbursements Prescriptions
Generic 22 52
Brand Name
Single source 68 38
Innovator multiple source 10 10
Total 100 100
SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office tabulations based on data collected by the Health Care Financing Administration on ^
Medicaid rebate program.
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THE MEDICAID REBATE PROGRAM
The manufacturer directly pays the Medicaid rebate on outpatient prescription drugs
to each state Medicaid agency.21 The basic rebate on brand-name drugs takes one of
two forms. It either equals a flat percentage of the average price paid by wholesalers
or is based on the lowest price charged to any U.S. purchaser, called the best price.
An additional rebate is also imposed on brand-name drugs when their prices rise faster
than the rate of inflation. That additional rebate makes it more difficult for
manufacturers to offset the basic rebate by raising prices faster than inflation.
Manufacturers of generic and over-the-counter drugs also pay a Medicaid rebate.
That rebate equals 11 percent of the average price that wholesalers pay.
Pharmaceutical manufacturers are required to sign a rebate agreement with the
Secretary of Health and Human Services if they want to participate in the Medicaid
reimbursement program. If a manufacturer chooses not to enter into a rebate
agreement, states will not receive federal Medicaid reimbursements for purchases of
that company's drugs.
; Rebate
All forms of the Medicaid rebate are based on the average manufacturer price (AMP)
paid by wholesalers, inclusive of all discounts and price reductions, "for drugs
distributed to the retail pharmacy class of trade.1122 Manufacturers are required to
report to the Health Care Financing Administration the AMP on every dosage form
of each drug they distribute. The basic rebate must be paid on all single-source and
innovator multiple-source drugs purchased by Medicaid beneficiaries. The basic
rebate on these brand-name drugs is equal to the greater of 15.1 percent of the AMP
or the difference between the AMP and the best price.23 Thus, if any U.S. purchaser
pays less than 84.8 percent of the AMP for a drug, the rebate is based on the best
price. The purpose of the best-price provision is to ensure that Medicaid pays
manufacturers no more for prescription drugs than any other U.S. purchaser does.
OBRA-90 established the basic rebate and limited it to 25 percent of AMP
through the end of 1991. In 1992, the limit was set at 50 percent of AMP (see
21. This section is based on section 1927 of the Social Security Act as amended by the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Acts
of 1990 and 1993 and the Veterans Health Care Act of 1992 (42 U.S.C. 1396r-8). It is also based on the Medicaid
rebate agreement signed by manufacturers.
22. Ibid.
23. The best price is calculated for each dosage form of a drug. It is the lowest price charged for that dosage form in any
package size.
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Table 2). Since 1992, there has been no limit on the basic rebate; in fact, it exceeds
70 percent of AMP on a few drugs because of the best-price provision. The size of
the minimum rebate has also increased from 12.5 percent in 1991 to its current level
of 15.1 percent
The best-price provision of the Medicaid rebate discourages manufacturers from
giving large discounts on outpatient drugs to other purchasers. Medicaid9 s purchases
constitute over 10 percent of the outpatient prescription drug market,
whereas the largest private institutional purchasers together may represent a smaller
portion of the market for outpatient drugs. Medicaid effectively obtains the best price
from manufacturers, but the reimbursement mechanism allows for a markup by both
the wholesaler and the pharmacy. Hence, Medicaid still pays more for prescription
drugs than some institutional purchasers do. In negotiating discounts with private
purchasers, the manufacturers balance the loss in revenues from lowering their price
on current sales against the increase in market share that a larger discount brings.
When Medicaid must be given access to the best price negotiated with any U.S.
TABLE 2. CHANGES IN THE MEDICAID REBATE RULES BETWEEN 1991 AND 1996
Basic Rebate
(In percent)
Year
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996 and
Beyond
Quarter
1-4
1-2
3
4
1-4
1-4
1-4
Minimum
12.5
12.5
12.5
15.7
15.7
15.4
15.2
15.1
Upper Limit
25
50
50
50
none
none
none
none
Are FSS Prices
Exempted from
Best-Price Calculation?
no
yes
no
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office.
NOTE: FSS = Federal Supply Schedule prices of the General Services Administration.
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purchaser, the size of the rebate that would be paid to Medicaid must also be
calculated as part of the cost of offering the best price to the largest private
purchasers. Since the Medicaid market is so large, that requirement can more than
double the cost of giving a discount in excess of the minimum rebate.
Manufacturers may sometimes hide a large discount on one drug by bundling its
sales with another drug. A bundled sale "refers to the packaging of drugs of different
types where the condition of the rebate or discount is that more than one drug type
is purchased."24 For example, suppose that drug A costs $4 per pill and drug B costs
$2 per pill and that a manufacturer would like to give some purchaser a 50 percent
discount off the price of drug A. The manufacturer could offer a purchaser the
following arrangement: when one pill of drug A is purchased along with two pills of
drug B, the buyer gets a $2 discount. The allocation of the discount for drugs under
a bundled sale "is made proportionately to the dollar value of the units of each drug
sold under the bundled arrangement."25
In the above example, the $2 discount is split between the two drugs. Since half
of the expenditures under that arrangement are on drug A and half are on drug B, the
discount is split evenly. For the best-price calculation, drug A costs $3 and drug B
costs $1.50 per pill. Both drugs sell at a 25 percent discount. If the discount had
been given on drug A alone, the best price for drug A would be $2 (a 50 percent
discount). In short, a large discount on one drug can be partially masked by bundling
its sales with another drug for which the manufacturer intends to give a very low (or
no) discount.
The Additional Rebate
If a drug's AMP rises faster than the inflation rate, an additional rebate is imposed to
discourage price increases. The additional rebate equals the difference between the
current quarter's AMP and the AMP in the quarter beginning July 1, 1990, after
adjusting by the percentage increase in the consumer price index for all urban
consumers.
For new drugs launched after October 1990, the additional rebate is based on the
difference between the current quarter's AMP and the AMP in the first quarter that
the drug is on the market. That provision may encourage manufacturers to launch
new drugs at a higher price during their first quarter on the market. A higher launch
24. From the definition of bundled sale in the Medicaid rebate agreement signed by manufacturers.
25. From the definition of best price in the Medicaid rebate agreement signed by manufacturers.
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price in the first quarter would yield a higher base AMP from which to calculate the
additional rebate in all subsequent quarters.
The additional rebate was intended to prevent manufacturers from circum-
venting the minimum rebate by raising prices. For example, the additional rebate
actually lowers profits on Medicaid sales when the AMP rises faster than the inflation
rate. Moreover, when combined with the best-price provision, the additional rebate
can have a very strong effect on unit revenues from Medicaid sales. When the best-
price provision applies, unit revenues equal the best price less the additional rebate.
The best price is already the lowest price to any purchaser in the United States, and
the additional rebate reduces the price paid by Medicaid even further (see Box 1).
Rebate on Generics
Manufacturers must pay a rebate equal to 11 percent of the AMP on noninnovator
multiple-source drugs—that is, generic and over-the-counter drugs. Since the Drug
Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act was passed in 1984, manu-
facturers of generic drugs have been allowed to use a shortened process to obtain
FDA approval. Under that process, they need only demonstrate bioequivalence to a
previously approved drug.
Calculating the Average Manufacturer Price
All forms of the Medicaid rebate increase as the reported AMP rises. The manu-
facturer must calculate an AMP for each dosage form of each drug distributed. The
AMP is calculated by dividing sales revenues to the retail sector, net of all discounts
and rebates to the retail class of trade, by the number of units sold. Sales to hospitals,
nursing homes, and other institutional purchasers are not included in calculating the
AMP.
Determining the Best Price
Federal government agencies not associated with Medicaid obtain some of the lowest
prices on Pharmaceuticals. Whether those prices are considered in the best-price
calculation can affect the discounts that manufacturers are willing to give private
purchasers.
Throughout 1991, most prices obtained by federal government agencies were
eligible to be counted as a best price. The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) is
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BOX1.
THE ADDITIONAL REBATE: SOME EXAMPLES
The additional rebate slightly lowers unit revenues on sales to Medicaid beneficiaries
when the average manufacturer price (AMP) rises faster than the rate of inflation as
measured by the consumer price index for all urban consumers. For example, if the
base-year AMP inflated to current dollars is equal to $10, a manufacturer will on
average net 15.1 percent less, or $8.49, when the current AMP is equal to S10.1 If the
manufacturer chooses to charge $12, average unit revenues on Medicaid sales decline
to $8.19. That decline occurs because the additional rebate ($2) compensates for the
AMP's rising faster than inflation and the minimum rebate increases (15.1 percent of
$12 instead of $10).2 When the AMP is increased to $12, unit revenues on sales to
Medicaid beneficiaries drop by 30 cents.
The additional rebate applies even when the basic rebate is based on the best
price. In that case, unit revenues on Medicaid sales are equal to the best price less the
additional rebate. Suppose that the best price is equal to $7, the AMP is $12, and the
base-year price adjusted for inflation is $10. Without the additional rebate, unit
revenues on average would be equal to the best price ($7). The additional rebate
would reduce unit revenues on Medicaid sales from $7 to $5. When the AMP rose
to $12, unit revenues on Medicaid sales would decline by the full amount of the
additional rebate-$2.
1. Unit revenues are equal to the AMP less the minimum rebate. Calculation: $10-0.152 (10) = $8.48.
2. Unit revenues are equal to the AMP less the minimum rebate less the additional rebate. Calculation: $12 •
0.152 (12) • ($12 - $10) = $8.18.
one of the largest federal direct purchasers of prescription drugs, spending more than
$900 million in fiscal year 1995.26 Medical centers belonging to the VA can purchase
prescription drugs either through the department's depot system or directly from the
manufacturer at the prices listed on the Federal Supply Schedule (FSS) for
Pharmaceuticals. Both the depot prices and the FSS prices are set by negotiations
between the VA and pharmaceutical manufacturers. Although the department's depot
prices have always been excluded from the best-price calculation, FSS prices
originally were not excluded.
During 1991, many of the FSS prices increased significantly, perhaps because of
the best-price provision in the Medicaid rebate agreement.27 The Congress responded
26. Personal communication with Jeff Ramirez, Pharmacy Services Department, Department of Veterans Afifairs, December
12,1995.
27. General Accounting Office, Medicaid: Changes in Drug Prices Paid by VA and DOD Since Enactment of Rebate
Provisions, GAO/HRD-91-139 (September 1991).
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by exempting FSS prices from the best-price calculation. The exemption was
temporary at first, holding only for the first six months of 1992. However, the
Congress permanently exempted all prices obtained by any federal agency from the
best-price calculation in the Veterans Health Care Act of 1992.28 Exempting federal
prices from the best-price calculation means that the prices obtained by private pur-
chasers are counted as the best price.
28. This act took effect in the fourth quarter of 1992. The act also excluded prices obtained by state pharmaceutical
assistance programs from the best-price calculation.
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PRICING IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY
AND THE MEDICATO REBATE
The effect of the best-price provision on the pricing of a specific drug depends on
whether the difference between the average manufacturer price and the best price
would exceed 15 percent if no Medicaid rebate existed. Hence, it depends in part on
how great the difference in sensitivity to price is among the different purchasers of
that drug.
The competitive conditions in the pharmaceutical market vary from drug to drug.
Manufacturers are probably more likely to offer steep discounts off the AMP when
a drug has close substitutes. Hence, the best-price provision may have a bigger
impact on pricing in more competitive markets. In addition, the larger Medicaid9 s
market share, the greater the impact of the best-price provision on the pricing of a
drug should be.
The Medicaid rebate program should not affect the AMP very much for drugs
on the market by 1990.1 Although the minimum rebate encourages firms to raise the
AMP, the additional rebate penalizes them for raising the AMP faster than the
inflation rate. On balance, the Medicaid rebate slightly discourages firms from
increasing the AMP fester than the rate of inflation as measured by the consumer price
index for all urban consumers (CPI-U). New drugs, however, may be launched at a
somewhat higher price because of the Medicaid rebate program. The analysis in this
chapter is based on an economic model in which firms can maximize profits by
charging different prices to different types of purchasers (for a full presentation of the
model, see the appendix).
WHO GETS DISCOUNTS
Over 60 percent of prescription drugs are distributed through more than 60,000
pharmacies and other retail stores (see Figure 1). The retail sector is generally the
least price-sensitive segment of the pharmaceutical market. Other segments include
hospitals, health maintenance organizations (HMOs), nursing homes, and clinics,
which together purchase 32 percent of all prescription drugs. Some drugs bought by
those pruchasers are used exclusively in an inpatient setting and are therefore not
1. The few instances in which the Medicaid rebate could have a very small effect on the AMP of drugs already on the
market are discussed in the appendix.
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FIGURE 1. CHANNELS OF PRESCRIPTION DRUG DISTRIBUTION
Manufacturer
Food Stores, j Pharmacies a Hospitals, Mail-Order
Pharmacies5Mass Merchandisers HMOs,
Nursing Homes,
Clinics
Market
Share: 12 percent 49 percent 32 percent 6 percent
SOURCE: MafketsharesarefiomTfePfafcSfeif, vol. 54 (March 16,1992) and are based on IMS America data. Distribution
channels are based on Micky Smith, Pharmaceutical Marketing Strategy and Cases (New York: Pharmaceutical
Products Press, 1991), Chapter 3; and Boston Consulting Group, The Changing Environment for US.
Pharmaceuticals (April 1993).
NOTE: HMO = health maintenance organization.
a. Some chain-store pharmacies buy directly from the manufacturer.
b. Some mail-order pharmacies go through a wholesaler.
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affected by the Medicaid rebate. Mail-order pharmacies distribute 6 percent of
prescription drugs.2
Wholesalers distribute about three-quarters of all prescription drugs, largely to
the retail sector. A single wholesaler purchases products from many different
pharmaceutical manufacturers.3 However, many large purchasers such as hospitals,
nursing homes, HMOs, and mail-order pharmacies buy directly from the manufacturer
rather than through a wholesaler.
Hospitals along with nursing homes, clinics, HMOs, mail-order pharmacies, and
pharmaceutical benefit management companies (PBMs) are among the groups that
may obtain discounts large enough to be affected by the best-price provision of the
Medicaid rebate. More specifically, the best-price provision directly affects only those
purchasers that could obtain discounts in excess of 15 percent off the AMP.
A recent General Accounting Office (GAO) survey found that four HMOs
received an average discount off the published list price of 32 percent in 1990 and 34
percent in 1991 on their top 100 outpatient drugs.4 Eight hospital group purchasing
organizations included in the GAO survey received discounts that averaged 29
percent off the list price on the top 50 outpatient drugs that they purchased. The
Congressional Budget Office calculated that a 32 percent discount off the list price
would be equivalent to a discount off the AMP of about 15 percent. That calculation
is based on the result that the AMP averages about 80 percent of the list price (see
Box 2). Therefore, those purchasers obtained discounts that were right at the
threshold where the best-price provision takes affect. Some drugs would have higher
discounts than that average, and others would have lower discounts. The best-price
provision could have affected the prices for those drugs with above-average
discounts.
Manufacturers sometimes give significant discounts to hospitals, HMOs, nursing
homes, and clinics because those institutions can exercise control over the choice of
prescriptions for a large group of patients through a formulary. A formulary is a list
of drugs that a hospital, HMO, or third-party payer encourages doctors to prescribe.
Formularies can be used as a means to exclude expensive drugs when lower-priced
substitutes are available. Not surprisingly, pharmaceutical manufacturers are
sometimes willing to give discounts in order to be included on an institution's
2. Based on IMS America data for 1991 reported in F-D-C Reports, "Mail Order Grew, The Pink Sheet, March 16, 1992.
3. Mickey Smith, Pharmaceutical Marketing Strategy and Cases (New York: Pharmaceutical Products Press, 1991),
Chapter 3; and Standard & Poor's, "Health Care Products & Services: Basic Analysis (New York: Standard &
Poor's, September 9,1993).
4. General Accounting Office, Medicaid: Changes in Drug Prices Paid by HMOs and Hospitals Since Enactment of
Rebate Provisions, GAO/HRD-93-43 (January 1993).
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BOX 2.
COMPARING THE AVERAGE MANUFACTURER PRICE
WITH THE LIST PRICE
The average wholesale price (AWP) is the published (list) price that manufacturers
suggest wholesalers charge their customers. Wholesalers usually charge pharmacists
a price that is lower than the AWP, which is the price that is most widely available in
published form. In contrast, the average manufacturer price (AMP), used to calculate
the Medicaid rebate, is not public information. The AMP is lower than die AWP since
it is the average price paid by wholesalers. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO)
has examined the relationship between the AMP and AWP to determine die equivalent
discount off the AWP that a private purchaser must obtain before die Medicaid best-
price provision applies.
CBO examined die relationship between die AWP and AMP for 224 drug products
that were die top-selling Medicaid drugs in 1993 (based on data collected by the Health
Care Financing Administration for the Medicaid rebate program and die AWPs
reported in Redback).1 For tiiat sample, die AMP averaged 80 percent of die AWP.
Therefore, wholesalers paid on average 80 percent of the list price for those drugs.
For 84 percent of die 224 drug products examined, die AMP fell between 75 percent
and 85 percent of the AWP. For 94 percent of the 224 drug products, the AMP fell
between 75 percent and 90 percent of die AWP. Given diat die AMP is equal to 80
percent of die AWP on average, a discount of 32 percent off the AWP equals a
discount of 15 percent off the AMP on average.
1. Medical Economics Data, 1994 Redbook (Montvale, N J.: MED, 1994).
formulary. Discounts can also be based on volume—for example, hospital purchasing
groups can sometimes obtain such discounts.
Increasingly, third-party payers—be they unions, insurance companies, or large
corporations—are also attempting to "manage" their outpatient drug benefits with
formularies.5 Many third-party payers are contracting with pharmaceutical benefit
management companies to take on the management for them. For instance, a PBM
contracts with a large group of pharmacies to sell prescription drugs to its customer
base at previously negotiated prices. The PBM and participating pharmacies then use
computer networks to help them both process claims automatically and apply a
5. Stephen W. Schondelmeyer and Joseph Tomas, "Trends in Retail Prescription Expenditures," Health Affairs (Fall
1990); and Office of Technology Assessment, Pharmaceutical RAD: Costs, Risks and Rewards (February 1993),
Chapter 10.
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formulary to purchases made by the PBM's customers. After a patient presents his
or her card, the pharmacist can determine immediately if the patient's prescription is
on the PBM's formulary. The PBM may give the pharmacist incentives to dispense
a generic drug when possible or to contact the physician and try to switch the
prescription if it is not on the formulary. PBMs also negotiate with pharmaceutical
manufacturers for a rebate in return for including their drugs on the formulary. The
six largest PBMs handled about 36 percent of all retail prescriptions in 1993, and the
largest company, PCS Health Systems, managed over half of those prescriptions.6
Mail-order companies can obtain discounts from manufacturers because they
often call physicians and ask them to switch the prescription to the most cost-effective
drug (a process called counterdetailing).7 Counterdetailing is probably more cost-
effective for mail-order pharmacies than for community pharmacies because a higher
proportion of mail-order customers are long-term users of pharmaceutical products.8
PRICE DISCRIMINATION AND THE MEDICAID REBATE
The analysis in this section is based on an economic model with two groups of
consumers—one representing the retail sector and the other representing purchasers
that have access to the best prices. Each group is charged a different price by the
manufacturer. Production costs are assumed to be constant no matter how much is
produced.9 The Medicaid rebate program is added to this simple, two-sector model.
Thus, the model fully incorporates the various forms of the Medicaid rebate, including
the best-price provision. Interested readers can refer to the appendix for a full
explanation of the model and the mathematical results.
Both firms and some consumers can benefit from price discrimination. Firms can
improve their profits by lowering prices selectively. Assuming fixed costs are already
covered, offering a lower price to some consumers that still exceeds variable
production costs will increase profits. Those consumers that obtain the lower price
will be better off.
6. F-D-C Reports, "PCS Manages 21 % of Retail Dispensed Prescriptions, The Pink Sheet, March 14, 1994. See also
Alex Barnum, McKesson Plans to Hold Onto PCS, San Francisco Chronicle, May 26, 1994, p. Bl; and General
Accounting Office, Pharmacy Benefit Managers: Early Results on Ventures with Drug Manufacturers, GAO/HEHS-96-
45 (November 1995).
7. For example, Medco, the largest mail-order pharmacy, obtains discounts from the manufacturers whose drugs they
favor (Fortune, February 24, 1992, p. 10).
8. Anita M. McGahan, "Industry Structure and Competitive Advantage, Harvard Business Review (November-December
1994), p. 120.
9. This simplifying assumption does not affect the results as long as unit costs do not change much when production is
increased beyond the level necessary to serve the retail sector alone.
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How the Medicaid Rebate Affects Discounting
The results of the model imply that the effect of the Medicaid rebate on discounting
will depend on the magnitude of the difference between the prices paid by the retail
sector (the AMP) and the best price. Suppose that before the Medicaid rebate
program was imposed, no purchasers received more than a 15 percent discount off
the average price charged to wholesalers (see the bottom panel of Figure 2). In that
case, the best-price provision would not affect the discounts obtained by large
purchasers. If, in the absence of the Medicaid rebate, the manufacturer of a drug
would not offer a discount in excess of 15 percent of the AMP, then applying the
best-price provision would not affect the price of that drug. New innovative drugs
with no close substitutes are more likely to have this pricing scheme. Because large
purchasers cannot find substitutes for those drugs, manufacturers are under less
pressure to offer discounts.
Manufacturers may tend to offer larger discounts off the wholesale price when
close substitutes are available. For example, the average best-price discounts
calculated by CBO were much lower for single-source drugs than for brand-name
drugs that faced generic competition (35 percent versus 51 percent in 1991). Now
suppose that in the absence of the Medicaid rebate the difference between the AMP
and the best price exceeds 15 percent of the AMP (as shown in the top panel of
Figure 2). In response to the best-price provision, firms are likely to either limit the
best-price discount to 15.1 percent of the AMP or shrink the size of the best-price
discount but still let it exceed 15.1 percent of the AMP. In either case, the best-price
discounts are lower than they would be without the Medicaid rebate.
When Are Big Discounts Still Profitable?
Although manufacturers have less incentive to give discounts in excess of 15.1
percent of the AMP, they have continued to give deep discounts on some drugs. The
larger Medicaid's market share for a given drug, the stronger the potential adverse
effect of the best-price provision on discounting. The conditions under which a
manufacturer finds it profitable to offer a higher discount than 15.1 percent off the
AMP to some purchasers depend critically on the size of the Medicaid market.
The best-price provision can greatly increase the costs of offering a discount in
excess of 15.1 percent. Before the Medicaid rebate provision, a manufacturer would
offer a discount to some purchasers in excess of 15.1 percent of the AMP if the
profits from the new sales generated by the higher discount offset the loss in revenues
from lowering the price to those purchasers. Under the best-price provision, when
the discount exceeds 15.1 percent, unit revenues decline on sales to Medicaid
beneficiaries as well. If the volume of sales to Medicaid is as large as the volume
purchased by those who can negotiate discounts in excess of 15.1 percent off the
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FIGURE 2. ILLUSTRATIVE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE BEST PRICE AND THE
AVERAGE MANUFACTURER PRICE
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SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office.
NOTE: AWP = average wholesale price; AMP = average manufacturer price.
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AMP, then the best-price provision doubles the cost of offering a discount in excess
of 15.1 percent.
The proportion of sales to Medicaid beneficiaries varies greatly among drugs.
CBO calculated the Medicaid market share for 89 top-selling drugs (see Table 3). For
20 percent of them, less than 5 percent of total sales went to Medicaid beneficiaries.
For 16 percent of the drugs, Medicaid's market share exceeded 20 percent. On
average, the Medicaid market share for those drugs was 12.2 percent. The types of
drugs that had a Medicaid market share in excess of 20 percent included treatments
for seizures, asthma, and infections. The variation in Medicaid market share among
different drugs is another reason why the impact of the Medicaid rebate on pricing
will vary from drug to drug. The best-price provision can have a strong adverse effect
on discounting for those drugs with an average-size Medicaid market share or higher.
But those drugs with a small Medicaid market share are more insulated from the
effects of the Medicaid rebate on pricing.
How discounts as high as 50 percent off the AMP would still be profitable after
the passage of the Medicaid rebate is difficult to explain unless a drug has a very small
Medicaid market share. When variable production costs average 20 percent of the
AMP, increasing a discount from 15.1 percent to 50 percent is profitable if the sales
to the purchasers who get that higher discount are doubled as a result. Under the
Medicaid rebate, if the volume of sales to those large purchasers is roughly equal to
the volume of sales to Medicaid, the sales to those purchasers would have to triple to
justify increasing the discount from 15.1 percent to 50 percent.10 In 1994, only 17
percent of the drug products still had discounts above 50 percent.
Another reason why some drug products still have discounts in excess of 50
percent may be that the prices of different drug products are interlinked when all the
drugs in a manufacturer's portfolio are negotiated simultaneously. Just as a super-
market may charge a very low price on a few products to attract consumers to the
store, so a manufacturer may choose to set some of the prices in its portfolio very low
in order to attract private purchasers to its product line. Moreover, in this case of
interiinkage, manufacturers might lower the price of drugs that are not affected by the
best-price provision in order to make up for increases in the price of drugs that are
affected. Best-price discounts may also remain high for teaching hospitals and other
institutions where the prescribing practices of new doctors can be affected.
The best-price provision of the Medicaid rebate should have had the biggest
impact on those purchasers that were getting the lowest prices—often those that
10. If incremental production costs were higher than 20 percent of the AMP, sales would have to increase more. The
Office of Technology Assessment estimated that production, distribution, and depreciation costs average 25.5 percent
of manu&cturer sales. See OTA, Pharmaceutical R&D, p. 91. The figure for incremental production costs would be
less than 25 percent since it does not include depreciation and other fixed costs.
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TABLE 3. SHARE OF THE MEDICAID MARKET FOR TOP-SELLING PRESCRIPTION
DRUGS (In percent)
Proportion of Drugs
Market Share with This Share*
Less Than 5 20
5 to 9.9 28
10 to 14.9 19
15 to 19.9 17
20 to 24.9 8
25 to 29.9 2
30 and Higher 6
SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office tabulations based on data collected by the Health Care Financing Administration on
the Medicaid rebate program. U.S. sales were obtained from MedAd News, May 1994.
a. Based on asample of 89 prescription drugs that ranked in the top 100 drugs by 1993 U.S. sales. The average Medicaid market
share for this sample was 12.2 percent
strictly enforced a formulary and had a very large patient base. Yet the rebate
program may have somewhat diminished the rewards available to large purchasers
that undertake the cost of organizing their patient base and using a strict formulary.
The best-price provision of the Medicaid rebate program may also have
strengthened the bargaining position of pharmaceutical manufacturers in their pricing
negotiations with large purchasers. Manufacturers could credibly claim that deep
discounts are no longer feasible since they are required to give the same discount to
the entire Medicaid market. Institutional purchasers are at somewhat of a
disadvantage because they cannot assess the size of their discounts relative to the
AMP, since that price is known only by the manufacturer.
The Effect of the Medicaid Rebate on the Retail Sector
The Medicaid rebate may affect not only the lowest prices charged by the
manufacturer for a drug but also the price charged to wholesalers for the retail class
of trade (the AMP). The minimum rebate creates an incentive for manufacturers to
raise the AMP. But the additional rebate does exactly the opposite—it reduces
revenues on Medicaid sales when a firm raises the AMP faster than the inflation rate.
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Overall, the results of the model imply that on balance the Medicaid rebate should
have very little effect on the AMP for drugs on the market by 1990. Firms are likely
to increase their AMP only if it is profitable to do so in the non-Medicaid retail sector.
The additional rebate does not, however, fully offset the effects of the minimum
rebate for new drugs launched after October 1990. For new drugs, the additional
rebate is based on the rate of increase in the AMP since the first quarter the drug was
on the market. In anticipation of the Medicaid rebate, new drugs may be launched at
a slightly higher price—in part, to offset revenue losses imposed by the minimum
rebate and to avoid the additional rebate, which would penalize subsequent price
increases. How great the effect of the Medicaid rebate on the pricing of new drugs
will be depends on how large the expected Medicaid market share of the new drug is.
CHAPTER IV
HOW THE MEDICAID REBATE HAS AFFECTED PRICING
The Medicaid rebate discourages discounting in the pharmaceutical industry.
Ironically, the size of best-price discounts has fallen in a market in which the price
sensitivity of buyers may be increasing. Enrollment in health maintenance organi-
zations and other managed care organizations is on the rise, and formularies are
increasingly used to link price with prescription choice. Yet counter to this trend,
manufacturers have reduced the size of their best-price discounts.
By reducing discounting in the pharmaceutical market, in some instances the
Medicaid rebate may have reduced the cost advantage that a consumer can obtain by
joining a plan in which the drug benefit is managed. The data indicate clearly that
those purchasers that had access to the best-price discounts saw a decline in the size
of their discounts. Less clear, however, is how broad the impact has been among all
purchasers that obtain discounts from pharmaceutical manufacturers. Since the
volume of sales made at the best-price discounts is not known, the size of the market
that is affected by increases in the best price is also not known.
Nevertheless, for 24 percent of the drugs in the Congressional Budget Office's
data set, the best-price discount fell by 30 percentage points or more. This swing in
discounting affects all of those purchasers that obtained a discount within 30 per-
centage points of the best-price discount.
CHANGES IN THE BEST-PRICE DISCOUNTS BETWEEN 1991 AND 1994
Based on the prices reported by manufacturers to the Health Care Financing
Administration under the Medicaid rebate agreement, CBO analyzed the change in
best-price discounts. The data set that CBO obtained from HCFA consists of the
average manufacturer price and the best price reported by pharmaceutical manu-
facturers for each quarter from January 1991 through June 1994. The data set also
includes the total dollar value of state reimbursements to pharmacies in 1991 through
1994, as well as the quantity of prescriptions reimbursed by the states. All of that
information is given for each dosage form of prescription drugs that Medicaid
beneficiaries purchase on an outpatient basis. The data set used for CBO's analysis
consisted of 1,886 different single-source and innovator multiple-source drug
products.1 However, many drugs come in more than one dosage form (tablet,
1. Those drug products that did not have Medicaid reimbursements in excess of about $100,000 in 1991, 1992, 1993,
or 1994 were dropped in order to improve the quality of the data. Although 2,755 out of 4,686 drug products were
deleted by this step, they constituted less than 1 percent of total sales of the original data set. An additional 45
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capsule, liquid) and in several strengths (amount of active ingredient). Consequently,
closer to 800 different brand-name drugs are in the data set.2
The empirical evidence suggests that between 1991 and 1994, the Medicaid
rebate program caused pharmaceutical manufacturers to reduce the size of their best-
price discounts substantially. Thirty-two percent of single-source drugs had a best-
price discount as high as 50 percent in 1991. By 1994, however, only 9 percent had
best-price discounts in that range.
Changes in the Average Best-Price Discount
The average best-price discount, weighted by total Medicaid payments for each drug,
declined from over 36 percent in the first quarter of 1991 to 20 percent in the second
quarter of 1994 (see Figure 3). (This weighting places greater emphasis on the best-
price discounts of those drugs with the highest sales to Medicaid, and more closely
reflects how the decline in best-price discounts affects the average basic rebate paid.)
Approximately 2 to 3 percentage points of the decline in the weighted average best-
price discount over that period can be attributed to the exemption of federal gov-
ernment prices from the best-price provision (see Box 3). Since federal government
agencies occasionally get the lowest prices of any U.S. purchaser, exempting them
from the best-price provision will sometimes increase the reported best price. Much
of the remaining decline in the weighted average best-price discount stems largely
from firms' reacting to the best-price provision by lowering their best-price discounts
on many drugs.
The links between the timing of the decline in the best-price discounts and the
changes in the best-price provision indicate that it was indeed the Medicaid rebate
program that was driving the decline in best-price discounts. In the first year, the
weighted average best-price discount declined by less than 2 percentage points (see
Table 4). The change was so small during the first year because a ceiling of 25
percent was placed on the size of the basic rebate. The best-price provision could
only increase the basic rebate from 12.5 percent to 25 percent of the average
manufacturer price in 1991 because of that ceiling. Hence, manufacturers could offer
a 50 percent discount to some customers and still pay a rebate equal to just 25 percent
of AMP on the units sold to Medicaid. The largest changes in the average best-price
discount between consecutive quarters occurred at the beginning of 1992 and 1993
when the ceiling on the basic rebate changed.
observations were deleted because of inconsistencies such as the best price exceeding the average manufacturer price
in more than one quarter.
2. Keeping only the top-selling dosage strengths reduces the sample to just over 1,000 drug products. This smaller sample
was used to calculate unweighted averages and to examine changes in the distribution of best-price discounts over time.
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FIGURE 3. WEIGHTED AVERAGE BEST-PRICE DISCOUNT, 1991-1994
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10
Percent
1991 1992 1993 1994
SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on data collected by the Health Care Financing Administration on the Medicaid
rebate program.
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BOX 3.
FEDERAL SUPPLY SCHEDULE PRICES
AND THE AVERAGE BEST-PRICE DISCOUNT
Between the first quarter of 1991 and the first quarter of 1992, the average best-price
discount fell by 9 percentage points. Part of die decline was caused by a change in
the reporting status of prices obtained by federal government agencies and therefore
does not reflect an actual change in pricing. Specifically, in the first quarter of 1992,
the low prices offered by pharmaceutical manufacturers to federal government
agencies were no longer counted as a best price for the purpose of calculating best-price
discounts for the Medicaid rebate. Thus, the part of die 9 percentage-point decline in
best-price discounts caused by the change in reporting status should not be attributed
to changes in pricing.
How much then of the decline in best-price discounts should be excluded
because it reflects only a change in reporting status? The Congressional Budget
Office estimates that the portion of the 9 percentage-point decline that resulted from
the federal government price exemption is .about 2 to 3 percentage points. That
estimate can be made because in the third quarter of 1992 the Federal Supply
Schedule (ESS) and other federal government prices were again eligible to be counted
as best prices. As a result, the average best-price discount increased in the third
quarter and then fell again in the fourth quarter when FSS prices were exempted
permanently. That change in reporting status can be used to isolate the effect of FSS
prices on the average best-price discount.
The calculation is based on the assumption that the weighted average discount
in die third quarter would have fallen halfway between die second- and fourth-quarter
values had the reporting rule not changed. This constructed average for the third
quarter was more than 2 percentage points below die actual weighted average best-price
discount in the third quarter. Therefore, the Congressional Budget Office concludes
that the FSS price exemption in the first quarter of 1992 probably lowered the average
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TABLE4. AVERAGE BEST-PRICE DISCOUNTS, 1991 -1994 (In percent)
All Drugs
Year
1991
1992
1993
1994
Quarter
1
2
3
4
1
2
3
4
1
2
3
4
1
2
Weighted
36.7
35.8
35.4
35.0
27.8
26.7
28.2
24.9
20.2
20.2
19.8
19.9
18.5
19.3
Unweighted
42.1
41.7
41.1
39.5
37.7
36.7
36.9
33.4
29.2
28.5
26.3
25.7
25.0
25.2
Top 100
Drugs,
Unweighted
35.1
34.1
33.6
33.2
27.8
27.8
27.8
24.7
18.8
18.5
18.5
18.8
18.8
19.3
SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on data collected by the Health Care Financing Administration on the Medicaid
rebate program.
The existence of a ceiling in the first year gave firms a grace period to adjust to
the new rebate program. Firms in some instances could have been locked in to low
price levels through contracts with private purchasers. The small change in discounts
during the first year of the program is consistent with the results of a General
Accounting Office report. That report found that the year after the Omnibus Budget
Recondliation Act was enacted, there was not a dramatic increase in the prices paid
for outpatient drugs by the health maintenance organizations and hospital group
purchasing organizations GAO surveyed.3
The decline in the average best-price discounts nearly leveled off in 1993 and
1994, and a slight upturn took place in the second quarter of 1994. Manufacturers
appear to have finished responding to the incentives created by the best-price
provision. The average best-price discount probably will not decline any further as
a result of the current Medicaid rebate regulations. If Medicaid was reformed through
3. General Accounting Office, Medicaid: Changes in Drug Prices Paid by HMOs and Hospitals Since Enactment of
Rebate Provisions, GAO/HRD-93-43 (January 1993).
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block grants, however, some states might choose to cut back on prescription drug
benefits since the resulting savings would fully accrue to the states. If the share of
purchases made by Medicaid in the prescription drug market was to decline, so would
the impact of the rebate program on drug pricing.
The average best discount on the top-selling drugs for Medicaid is lower than the
average best discount on all drugs. For example, in the first quarter of 1991 the
average best discount (unweighted) on all drugs was 42 percent, whereas the average
best discount on the top-selling drugs in the sample was 35 percent. The average
discount on those top-selling drugs also declined substantially between 1991 and
1993, falling from 35 percent in the first quarter of 1991 to 19 percent in the first
quarter of 1993. The impact of the Medicaid rebate on the discounts offered on the
top-selling drugs is important because those drugs constitute a large portion of rebate
payments as well as of private-sector expenditures.
The best-price discounts on both single-source and multiple-source innovator
drugs declined substantially between 1991 and 1994. The average best discount for
multiple-source innovator drugs in the first quarter of 1991 was 51 percent, whereas
for single-source drugs the average was just 35 percent (see Figure 4). By the second
quarter of 1994, the average best-price discount on multiple-source innovator drugs
fell to 32 percent, a drop of 19 percentage points from its 1991 level. The average
best discount on single-source drugs fell to 21 percent, a decline of 14 percentage
points.
Change in the Distribution of Best-Price Discounts
The Medicaid rebate had a large impact on the pricing of those drugs that were most
heavily discounted in 1991. For example, large discounts off the AMP became much
less common. In the first quarter of 1991,40 percent of the best discounts exceeded
50 percent off the AMP. By the second quarter of 1994, only 17 percent of the best
discounts exceeded 50 percent off the AMP.
CBO examined how the distribution of best-price discounts changed between
1991 and 1994 (see Figure 5). In 1991, the best-price discounts were more evenly
spread out, with as many drugs being discounted between 80 percent and 90 percent
as were discounted between 10 percent and 20 percent. By 1994, a clear pattern
emerged in which most of the best discounts were concentrated in the lower ranges.
In the first quarter of 1991, only one-third of the best discounts were less than 20
percent off the AMP. Yet by 1994, 56 percent of the best discounts were less than
20 percent off the AMP.
The change in the distribution of best-price discounts on single-source drugs is
even more dramatic (see Figure 6). In 1991, one-third of single-source drugs had
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FIGURE 4. UNWEIGHTED AVERAGE BEST-PRICE DISCOUNTS, 1991-1994
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SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on data collected by the Health Care Financing Administration on the Medicaid
rebate program.
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FIGURE 5. DISTRIBUTION OF BEST-PRICE DISCOUNTS FOR ALL BRAND-
NAME DRUGS
1991
Percentage of Drags
Oto lO 10to20 20to30 30to40 40to50 S0to60 60to70 70to80 80to90 90tolOO
Size of the Best-Price Discount (In percent)
1994
Percentage of Drags
Oto lO 10to20 20to30 30to40 40toSO 50to60 60to70 70to80 80to90 90tolOO
Size of the Best-Price Discount (In percent)
SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on data collected by the Health Care Financing Administration on the
Medicaid rebate program.
NOTE: Manufacturers are not required to report those prices equal to or less than 10 percent of the average manufacturer
price (AMP). Hence, best-price discounts as high as 90 percent off the AMP are rarely recorded.
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FIGURE 6. DISTRIBUTION OF BEST-PRICE DISCOUNTS FOR SINGLE-
SOURCE DRUGS
1991
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SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on data collected by the Health Care Financing Administration on the
Medicaid rebate program.
NOTE: Manufacturers are not required to report those prices equal to or less than 10 percent of the average manufacturer
price (AMP). Hence, best-price discounts as high as 90 percent off the AMP are rarely recorded.
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best-price discounts in excess of 50 percent. By 1994, best-price discounts were
much more concentrated in the lower ranges with only 9 percent of single-source
drugs having best discounts above 50 percent. In 1991, just over half of the single-
source drugs had discounts of 30 percent or less. By 1994, three-quarters of the
single-source drugs had discounts of 30 percent or less. Single-source drugs
constitute two-thirds of Medicaid reimbursements. They also constitute roughly the
same proportion of U.S. sales; most top-selling drugs are single-source drugs.
Therefore, the changing best-price discounts on those drugs can have a large impact
on both Medicaid rebate revenues and prescription drug expenditures of private
purchasers that negotiate discounts.
Half of all innovator multiple-source drugs had discounts of over 50 percent in
1991. By 1994, only 28 percent of innovator multiple-source drugs had discounts in
that range. As Figure 7 shows, a shift toward lower best-price discounts took place
between 1991 and 1994 for multiple-source drugs as well, though it was much less
pronounced than for single-source drugs. Innovator multiple-source drugs constitute
just 10 percent of Medicaid reimbursements. The changes in the best prices of
multiple-source drugs may have had a smaller effect on the expenditures of private
purchasers because there is often an option to substitute a generic drug. In fact,
manufacturers frequently offer higher discounts on innovator multiple-source drugs
because those drugs face generic competition.
The best-price provision creates an incentive for firms to lower their best-price
discounts to the level of the minimum rebate (15.1 percent in 1996). It does not,
however, change the incentives to offer no discounts or to offer very low discounts.
The proportion of single-source drugs with best-price discounts between 5 percent
and 15 percent doubled between 1991 and 1994—by 1994,30 percent of single-source
drugs had best-price discounts in that range (see Figure 8). At the same time, the
proportion of single-source drugs with discounts in excess of 20 percent declined
from 59 percent in 1991 to 36 percent by 1994. That change in the distribution of
discounts for single-source drugs, which constitute 68 percent of Medicaid
expenditures on outpatient prescription drugs, is in part a response to the incentives
created by the Medicaid rebate.
Surprisingly, for 30 percent of the drugs in the sample, the best-price discounts
were higher in 1994 than in 1991 (see Table 5). However, for over two-thirds .of
those drugs, the best-price discount increased only because the AMP rose more
rapidly than the best price, not because the best price itself declined. The average
best-price discount for single-source drugs in this group rose from 17 percent in 1991
to 26 percent in 1994. That evidence suggests that the best-price provision has not
eliminated the incentive for manufacturers to give discounts of more than 15 percent
in order to increase market share.
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FIGURE 7. DISTRIBUTION OF BEST-PRICE DISCOUNTS FOR MULTIPLE-
SOURCE DRUGS
1991
Percentage of Drugs
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Size of the Best-Price Discount (In percent)
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SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on data collected by the Health Care Financing Administration on the
Medicaid rebate program.
NOTE: Manufacturers are not required to report those prices equal to or less than 10 percent of the average manufacturer
price (AMP). Hence, best-price discounts as high as 90 percent off the AMP are rarely recorded.
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FIGURE 8. BEST-PRICE DISCOUNTS FOR SINGLE-SOURCE DRUGS
Percentage of Drug
1991
0 to 5 S to 10 10 to IS IS to 20
Size of the Best -Pr ice Discount (In percent)
A b o v e 20
80
70
60
SO
40
30
20
10
0
Percentage of Drugs
1994
0 to 5 S to 10 10 to IS IS to 20
Size of the Best-Price Discount (In Percent)
Above 20
SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on data collected by the Health Care Financing Administration on the
Medicaid rebate program.
NOTE: Manufacturers are not required to report those prices equal to or less than 10 percent of the average manufacturer
price (AMP). Hence, best-price discounts as high as 90 percent off the AMP are rarely recorded.
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TABLE 5. HOW BEST-PRICE DISCOUNTS CHANGED BETWEEN 1991 AND 1994
Percentage-Point Difference
Between Best-Price Discounts
in 1991 and 1994
Lower in 1994 by
OtolO
10 to 20
20to30
Over 30
Greater in 1994
rercer
All
25
14
8
24
30
iiage 01 orana-iM
Single
Source
26
14
7
22
31
lame urugs
Multiple-Source
Innovators
23
13
9
27
28
SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on data collected by the Health Care Financing Administration on the Medicaid
rebate program.
The best-price discount is only an indicator of the level of discounting that occurs
with a given drug. Purchasers that negotiate discounts with pharmaceutical
companies can receive anything from a small discount off the AMP up to the best-
price discount. If the best-price discount on a drug declines from 50 percent to 30
percent, any purchaser that received a discount in excess of 30 percent is affected.
The best-price discounts of 24 percent of all drugs in the sample declined by 30
percentage points or more between 1991 and 1994 (see Table 5). Moreover, such
dramatic declines in best-price discounts were not confined to multiple-source drugs.
The best-price discounts of 22 percent of the single-source drugs declined by at least
30 percentage points between 1991 and 1994. Although probably only a small
number of purchasers have access to the best-price discounts, many more purchasers
may obtain a discount within 30 percentage points of the best-price discount.
Price Changes
CBO created two price indices to assess the change in both the AMPs and the best
prices (see Table 6). The drugs purchased in 1993 by Medicaid beneficiaries were
used as the basket of goods to create the price indices. Despite the additional rebate,
the AMP price index increased by 14.8 percent between 1991 and 1994; the rate of
inflation over the same period, as measured by the consumer price index for all urban
consumers (CPI-U), was 8.6 percent. During 1991, the percentage increase in the
AMP index was more than twice that of the CPI-U (6.7 percent compared with 2.6
percent), which is roughly in line with the experience of the producer price index
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TABLE 6. PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN PRICE INDEXES, 1991-1994
January 1996
Time Period*
1991 to 1992
1992 to 1993
1993 to 1994
Total, 1991 to 1994
Index for
BestPricesb
14.6
12.6
3.9
34.1
Index for
Average
Manufacturer
Pricesb
6.7
4.5
3.0
14.8
Producer
Price Index for
Pharmaceuticals
7.7
5.0
3.6
17.2
Consumer
Price Index
2.6
3.3
2.5
8.6
SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on data collected by the Health Care Financing Administration on the Medicaid
rebate program. The fourth and fifth colums are from the Department of Commerce, Bureau of Labor Statistics.
a. Based on data from the first quarter of each year.
b. Based on the quantities of single-source and innovator multiple-source drugs purchased by Medicaid beneficiaries in 1993.
(PPI) for Pharmaceuticals before the Medicaid rebate program (see Table 7).
Between 1985 and 1991, the PPI for Pharmaceuticals increased each year by at least
8 percent whereas the CPI-U never increased by more than 5.4 percent. Viewed in
that context, the percentage increase in the AMP index in 1991 was not unusual.
After 1991, the percentage increase in the AMP index was much closer to the
percentage increase in the CPI-U.
The change in the best-price index far exceeded the change in the AMP index.
Between 1991 and 1994, the best-price index rose by 34 percent—over twice the
percentage change in the AMP price index (see Table 6). That result confirms that
the difference between best prices and AMPs was narrowing over this period largely
because the best prices were rising. Most of the increase in the best-price index
occurred during the first two years that the Medicaid rebate program was in effect.
During 1993, the percentage increase in the best-price index was very close to the
percentage increase in the producer price index for pharmaceuticals. Evidently, by
1993 manufacturers had largely adjusted to the incentives created by the best-price
provision.
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TABLE?.
Year
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
ANNUAL CHANGE IN THE PRODUCER PRICE AND CONSUMER PRICE
INDEXES, 1974-1994 (In percent)
PPIfor
Pharmaceuticals
-0.2
0
1.0
4.2
8.6
6.4
4.1
5.2
7.1
8.9
11.7
11.1
10.7
9.2
9.2
8.8
9.1
7.9
9.1
8.9
8.3
6.5
4.5
3.2
PPIfor
All Products
3.1
3.2
9.1
15.4
10.6
4.5
6.4
7.9
11.2
13.4
9.2
4.1
1.6
2.1
1.0
-1.4
2.1
2.5
5.2
4.9 '
2.1
1.2
1.2
0.6
Consumer
Price Index
4.4
3.2
6.2
11.0
9.1
5.8
6.5
7.6
11.3
13.5
10.3
6.2
3.2
4.3
3.6
1.9
3.6
4.1
4.8
5.4
4.2
3.0
3.0
2.6
SOURCE: Bureau of Labor Statistics and the Economic Report of the President, 1995.
NOTE: PPI = producer price index.
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CHANGES IN THE AVERAGE BASIC REBATE BETWEEN 1991 AND 1994
Firms responded to the incentives created under the Medicaid rebate program by
lowering their best-price discounts. As a result, the Medicaid rebates paid today are
lower than they would be if firms had left their discounts at the higher 1991 levels (see
Figure 9 for the average basic rebate, weighted by sales, in each quarter from 1991
to 1994). The basic rebate is equal to a flat percentage of the AMP (15.4 percent in
1994) or to the difference between the AMP and the best price, whichever is greater.
The best-price provision increased the basic rebate from the flat 15.4 percent to 22.8
percent of AMP on average in 1994 (see Table 8). CBO estimates that if best-price
discounts were still at 1991 levels, the weighted average basic rebate in 1994 would
have been much higher—38.6 percent. Therefore, the decline in best-price discounts
since 1991 lowered the average basic rebate by almost 16 percentage points in 1994.
The decline in the average basic rebate appears to have leveled off in 1994.
Although no cap on the basic rebate existed in 1994, the amount by which the
best-price provision increased the basic rebate was no larger in 1994 than in 1991,
when there was a cap of 25 percent. The best-price provision increased the average
basic rebate paid by 7 to 8 percentage points in both 1991 and 1994. Thus, the
decline in best-price discounts since 1991 has limited the contribution of the best-price
provision to the average basic rebate. In fact, by 1994 less than 30 percent of the
average basic rebate could be attributed to the best-price provision.
The contribution of the best-price provision to the average rebate was highest in
1992 when the cap was increased from 25 percent to 50 percent. Similarly, the
average basic rebate was highest in 1992. As a result of the 25 percent cap in 1991,
the average basic rebate was just 20 percent to 21 percent of the AMP. In 1992, the
ceiling was increased to 50 percent and as a result the average basic rebate rose to
about 25 percent of the AMP.
In two instances, declining best-price discounts offset changes that would have
increased the basic rebate. In the fourth quarter of 1992, the flat rebate increased by
over 3 percentage points (from 12.5 percent to 15.7 percent), but the average basic
rebate was less than 1 percentage point higher than in the second quarter. (The third
quarter cannot be used as a comparison because of the temporary change in the rule
regarding FSS prices.) The decline in best-price discounts had offset much of the
increase in the flat rebate. In 1993, the ceiling on the basic rebate was lifted entirely.
The flat rebate was still 15.7 percent, 3 percentage points higher than in early 1992.
The average basic rebate, however, was no higher in 1993 than in early 1992.
Manufacturers had lowered their best-price discounts enough in 1993 to offset the
effect of the higher flat rebate and the repeal of the ceiling.
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FIGURE 9. WEIGHTED AVERAGE BASIC REBATE, 1991-1994
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SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on data collected by the Health Care Financing Administration on the Medicaid
rebate program.
44 HOW THE MEDICAID REBATE HAS AFFECTED DRUG PRICING January 1996
TABLE 8. CHANGES IN THE AVERAGE BEST-PRICE DISCOUNT AND BASIC REBATE
BETWEEN 1991 AND 1994 (to percent)
Year
1991
1992
1993
1994
SOURCE:
Weighted
Average
Best-Price
Quarter Discount
1
2
3
4
1
2
3
4
1
2
3
4
1
2
36.7
35.8
35.4
35.0
27.8
26.7
28.2
24.9
20.2
20.2
19.8
19.9
18.5
19.3
Basic Rebate
Weighted
Average
20.8
20.4
20.2
19.9
25.6
24.7
25.9
25.4
24.7
24.3
23.9
23.8
22.4
22.8
Minimum
12.5
12.5
12.5
12.5
12.5
12.5
12.5
15.7
15.7
15.7
15.7
15.7
15.4
15.4
Average
Contribution
of Best-Price
Provision to
Basic Rebate
8.3
7.9
7.7
7.4
13.1
12.2
13.4
9.7
9.0
8.6
8.2
8.1
7.0
7.4
Congressional Budget Office based on data collected by the Health Care Financing Administration on the Medicaid
rebate program.
The decline of the best-price discounts between 1991 and 1994, in part because
of the Medicaid rebate program, comes as no surprise to policymakers. Indeed, CBO
accounted for a decline in best-price discounts when it estimated the anticipated
savings from the Medicaid rebate program.
CHAPTER V
OPTIONS FOR CHANGING THE BEST-PRICE PROVISION
The Congressional Budget Office examined two alternatives that could reduce the
interference of the Medicaid rebate with discounting, while having a very small impact
on the total savings obtained under the Medicaid rebate. One alternative is to repeal
the best-price provision and compensate for the loss in savings by raising the minimum
rebate. A second option is to place a cap on the basic rebate.
For the first alternative, CBO estimates that repealing the best-price provision
would be budget neutral in 1996 if at the same time the minimum rebate was increased
from 15.1 percent to 22.6 percent. Whether such an increase could itself affect
pricing is discussed below. The minimum basic rebate in 1996 and thereafter is IS. 1
percent. CBO calculated that the weighted average basic rebate in 1994 would have
been 22.6 percent if the minimum rebate at that time had been 15.1 percent. Any
option that maintained an estimated weighted average basic rebate of 22.6 percent in
1996 and beyond would be approximately budget neutral. Those estimates do not
account for any change in best-price discounts that might occur as manufacturers
responded to changes in the best-price provision.
The second alternative-a cap combined with an increase in the minimum rebate-
could also maintain budget neutrality. Since capping the basic rebate is a more
gradual step than repealing the best-price provision, it would require a smaller
compensating increase in the minimum rebate. A 50 percent cap on the basic rebate
combined with an increase in the minimum rebate from 15.1 percent to 16.7 percent
would be budget-neutral in 1996 (see Table 9).
The two options are designed to reduce the impact of the best-price provision on
the incentive of firms to offer steep discounts without reducing the savings the federal
government obtains through the Medicaid rebate. Eliminating the best-price provision
would require more than a 7 percentage-point increase in the minimum rebate to
maintain budget neutrality. Alternatively, capping the basic rebate would limit the
impact of the best-price provision on discounting and require a smaller increase in the
minimum rebate to maintain budget neutrality.
A cap would reduce the basic rebate only in those instances in which the best-
price discount exceeded the cap. CBO calculates that a 50 percent cap would reduce
the average basic rebate by about 1 percentage point, and a 40 percent cap would
reduce the weighted average basic rebate by about 2 percentage points.
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The lower the cap, the higher the required increase would be in the minimum
rebate to maintain budget neutrality. For instance, a cap of 40 percent on the basic
rebate would require an increase in the minimum rebate from 15.1 percent to 18
percent to maintain budget neutrality. A 70 percent cap would require less than a 0.5
percentage-point increase in the minimum rebate to maintain budget neutrality. Since
few best-price discounts are as high as 70 percent, such a high cap would not have a
big effect on rebate revenues or on discounting. Conversely, a cap as low as 30
percent would require a much larger increase in the minimum rebate to be budget
neutral because many more best-price discounts exceed that amount.
When the cap is as low as 30 percent, the difference between the cap and the
minimum rebate required for budget neutrality is small—just 10 percentage points. As
the gap between the minimum rebate and the cap narrows, the option begins to
resemble a repeal of the best-price provision accompanied by a higher minimum rebate
of 22.6 percent.
In response to a cap on the basic rebate, firms could raise some of their best
discounts that already exceeded the level of the cap. Firms could also increase the
level of best discounts that were just under the cap. A cap limits the extent to which
the Medicaid rebate increases the cost of giving some customers large discounts.
That limit on the basic rebate would benefit a number of private-sector purchasers
if firms were to raise some of their discounts as a result.
TABLE 9. THE EFFECT OF COMBINING A CAP ON THE BASIC REBATE WITH A HIGHER
MINIMUM REBATE TO MAINTAIN BUDGET NEUTRALITY (In percent)
Cap on the Minimum Rebate Required
Basic Rebate for Budget Neutrality*
70 15.4
60 15.9
50 16.7
40 18.0
30 20.0
SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office calculations based on data collected by the Health Care Financing Administration
on the Medicaid rebate program.
a. The minimum rebate in 1996 and thereafter is 15.1 percent These options are budget neutral for 1996 and beyond
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A repeal of the best-price provision would require about a 7 percentage-point
increase in the minimum rebate to maintain budget neutrality. Such a large increase
in the minimum rebate could affect the average manufacturer price. However, the
additional rebate would limit the extent to which manufacturers could compensate for
an increase in the minimum rebate by raising the AMP.
Firms could partially offset an increase in the minimum rebate by charging higher
launch prices for new drugs. However, for drugs already on the market, an increase
in the minimum rebate could cause manufacturers to raise their AMP only in instances
in which they were charging less than the price that maximizes profits. If firms were
already charging the profit-maximizing AMP, then increasing the AMP further would
not increase profits on non-Medicaid sales. Moreover, the additional rebate would
prevent a price increase from raising unit revenues on Medicaid sales.
Hence, if firms were already charging the profit-maximizing AMP, they could not
compensate for an increase in the minimum rebate by raising the AMP. However,
there may be some markets, particularly for new and unique drugs, in which firms face
no close competitors and could profitably charge higher prices, but do not. Public
opinion may limit prices in those instances. If such markets exist, firms in them could
compensate for an increase in the minimum rebate by slightly raising their prices.
Another alternative to the Medicaid rebate (though not examined by CBO) would
be to encourage Medicaid beneficiaries to enroll in health maintenance or other
managed care organizations that can negotiate their own discounts with manufac-
turers. In a few states, that alternative is already happening. By the end of 1994,
eight states had obtained demonstration waivers from statutory Medicaid require-
ments from the Health Care Financing Administration to help them move many of
their Medicaid beneficiaries into managed care organizations.1 Most of those states
have turned over the prescription drug benefit to the managed care organizations (or
plan to), in which case the Medicaid rebate does not apply. But those organizations
are free to negotiate their own discounts with manufacturers.2
Substantial reforms to the Medicaid program were included in the Balanced
Budget Act passed by the Congress in November 1995. Although the President
vetoed the act, subsequent budget legislation may include similar reforms to Medicaid.
The act would turn full responsibility for Medicaid over to the states and continue
federal support through block grants. In short, the direct link between state expen-
1. Those eight states are Arizona, Florida, Hawaii, Kentucky, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and Tennessee.
Seven additional states are seeking waivers for that purpose. See Mark Meriis, Medicaid: Program and
Demonstration Waivers, 95-109 EPW (Congressional Research Service, December 23, 1994).
2. Personal communication with Sidney Trieger, Office of Research Demonstrations, Health Care Financing
Administration, August 21, 1995.
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ditures and federal funding would be broken, but the Medicaid rebate program would
be left intact. However, the rebate savings would no longer be shared by the federal
government; instead, they would belong entirely to the states. Under such a reform
of Medicaid, the options proposed above would be budget neutral for the states, since
changes in the rebate formula would no longer affect the federal budget.
If the Medicaid program was reformed through block grants, the savings that
could be obtained from reducing Medicaid prescription drug coverage would accrue
entirely to the states. As a result, some states might choose to reduce the number of
people eligible for drug benefits under Medicaid or eliminate those benefits entirely.
If Medicaid's market share was to decline significantly, the impact of the rebate
program on drug pricing would diminish.
APPENDIX
PRICE DISCRIMINATION
AND THE MEDICAID REBATE:
A MODEL
This appendix presents a basic mathematical (economic) model that explains the
pricing behavior of a pharmaceutical manufacturer charging different prices to
different groups of buyers. The model demonstrates the relationship between price
and costs of production under differing degrees of price sensitivity that buyers may
display and examines the impact of the Medicaid rebate program on that relationship.
A very basic model of third-degree price discrimination in which different
groups of purchasers are charged different prices based on observable characteristics
can be depicted as follows:
where:
p! = the price charged to group 1
p2 = the price charged to group 2
ql = the quantity sold to group 1
q2 = the quantity sold to group 2
c = unit production costs (marginal cost), which are constant
The first-order conditions yield:
€i
where ^ and e2 represent the elasticities of demand of the respective group of
purchasers. Assuming that group 2 has a more elastic demand than group 1, it will
obtain a lower price. This model assumes that marginal cost is constant Nothing
is lost by that assumption if production costs per unit do not change when group 2
is served in addition to group 1.
If the manufacturer is restricted to offering the same price to both groups
(uniform pricing), the inverse of the price-cost margin will be a weighted average
of the elasticities of demand of each group where the weights are the quantities
demanded. Under uniform pricing, group 1 will pay less and group 2 will pay more
than when the manufacturer practices price discrimination.1
1. Jean Tirole, The Theory of Industrial Organization (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1989), pp. 137-140.
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Accounting for the Medicaid rebate complicates the model somewhat The
share of retail sales purchased by Medicaid beneficiaries is denoted by m. The new
profit-maximizing equation (assuming the minimum rebate is equal to 15 percent)
is:
where:
p! = the price manufacturers charge the retail sector (the average manu-
facturer price)
p2 = the lowest price to any purchaser in the United States (the best
price)
po = the inflated base-year price (used to calculate the additional rebate)
ql = the quantity sold to the retail sector
q2 = the quantity sold at p2
m = the proportion of retail-sector sales made to Medicaid beneficiaries
In reality, many purchasers pay manufacturers many different prices. The point here
is to focus on the retail sector and those purchasers that have access to the lowest
prices. The model also assumes that the proportion of retail sales made to Medicaid
beneficiaries (m) does not change when px changes.
Purchasers not included in the model are those that pay less than pj but more
than p2. Those purchasers can be divided into two groups: ones that pay more than
85 percent of pl and ones that pay less than 85 percent of pj. The former group will
not be affected by the best-price provision. The latter group may be affected by the
best-price provision if p2 rises by a sufficient amount. Hence, what happens to those
purchasers can be assessed to some degree by examining what happens to p2.
Three basic cases exist based on the difference between px and p2.
Case A: Without the Medicaid rebate, the difference between pl and p2 would be
less than 15 percent of pj.
In this case, firms would not offer group 2 a discount over 15 percent off the
price to group 1 (the retail sector), even if there was no Medicaid rebate. Whether
the difference between pl and p2 would be this small depends on the difference in
price elasticities between the two groups of purchasers. The ratio (p^Pi) without the
Medicaid rebate is equal to:
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€1
If this ratio is less than or equal to 0.85, then Case A holds. The profit-maximizing
equation becomes:
H = (Pl-c)ql + (P2~c)q2 -
The first-order conditions for p2 do not change-the Medicaid rebate does not
affect p2 in this case. The first-order conditions for pl depend on whether pl exceeds
the inflated base-year price p0. In the case where pl does not exceed p0 (the
additional rebate is equal to zero), the first-order condition for pl implies:
£j-^ . = - — + 0.15m(l + —)
Pl el €1
The second term is positive, indicating that pl (or the markup over cost) is
higher because of the minimum rebate. When the effect of the additional rebate is
considered, however, firms will be discouraged from raising pl above the inflated
base-year price.
In one instance, the Medicaid rebate could slightly raise the average manu-
facturer price (AMP) of drugs already on the market For drugs for which the AMP
would have increased more slowly than the inflation rate, the minimum rebate
pushes the AMP slightly upward. That increase occurs because firms respond to the
minimum rebate by increasing prices and the additional rebate does not take effect
until prices rise faster than the rate of inflation. The minimum rebate and additional
rebate together push the AMP toward the inflation-adjusted base-year price.
CaseB: Without the Medicaid rebate, the difference between pl and p2 exceeds 15
percent of px. Firms respond to the Medicaid rebate by limiting p2 to 85 percent of
Pi-
Substituting for p2, the profit maximization equation becomes:
Noting that the derivative of q2 with respect to p! is:
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~
L = 0.85
dpl
The first-order conditions for pl imply:
= - — + 0.15m(l + —) - 0.85
Pi Cl Cl *1€1 P2
Just as in Case A, the second term indicates that the minimum rebate puts upward
pressure on pr The third term in the equation is negative, indicating that pl is lower
than in Case A. The third term reflects that fact that by lowering pl slightly, firms
can charge group 2 a price that is closer to their true profit-maximizing price, while
maintaining p2 equal to 85 percent of pj.
The third term implies that when firms choose to limit the best-price discount
to 15 percent of the AMP, there is a small incentive to lower the AMP. However,
since the size of the retail sector (group 2) is very large relative to the size of the
market that previously obtained more than a 15 percent discount off the AMP (group
1), the effect has to be very small. That effect is also at least partially offset by the
incentive to raise the AMP because of the minimum rebate. In Case B, the Medicaid
rebate probably has a very small downward effect on the AMP, and the best price
(p2> has increased to 85 percent of px.
Cased Without the Medicaid rebate, the difference between pl and p2 exceeds 15
percent of px. Firms respond to the Medicaid rebate by raising p2, but p2 is still less
than 85 percent of pj.
The profit-maximizing equation becomes:
n = (pl - c)q l + (p2 - c)q2 - (pl
The first-order condition for p2 implies:
?2 €2 *2
In this case, the best-price provision increases p2. The effect is greater as Medicaid's
market share increases relative to the market share of those purchasers with access
to the best price (q .^
In sum, the best-price provision increases the price paid by group 2 in Cases B
and C but has no effect on die price paid by group 2 in Case A. The Medicaid rebate
does not have much effect on pt. The additional rebate discourages firms from
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raising pl faster than inflation to compensate for the minimum rebate. And when the
best-price provision applies, there can be a very small incentive to lower p^

